Competition Law: Frequently Asked Questions

What is the AfCFTA Competition Protocol?

The AfCFTA Competition Protocol is the continental competition framework of the African Continental Free Trade Area. The African Union Assembly adopted it at its 36th Ordinary Session on 18–19 February 2023 in Addis Ababa. It establishes the substantive and institutional architecture for cross-border competition enforcement across AfCFTA state parties.

The Protocol addresses anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, mergers with a continental dimension, and the creation of an AfCFTA Competition Authority. Ratification is ongoing; the Protocol enters into force for each state party upon deposit of its instrument of ratification.

In practice the Protocol is designed to coordinate with existing regional bodies (COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS) rather than replace them.

Is competition law the same as antitrust law?

Yes. “Antitrust” is the term used in the United States; “competition law” is used in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and most African and Commonwealth jurisdictions. Both describe the same field: rules against anti-competitive agreements, abuse of market power, and mergers that harm competition.

The vocabulary differs in places even where the concepts match. What the EU calls “abuse of dominance” the United States calls “monopolisation”; what the EU calls a “concentration” most other regimes call a “merger”. The analytical questions are largely the same.

What are the three main areas of competition law?

Anti-competitive agreements (including cartels), abuse of a dominant position, and merger control. Many regimes add two further pillars: state aid or subsidy control, and ex ante regulation of digital platforms such as the EU Digital Markets Act.

• Anti-competitive agreements: Price-fixing, bid-rigging, market-sharing and other coordination between competitors. Article 101 TFEU in the EU; Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 in the UK.
• Abuse of dominance: Exclusionary or exploitative conduct by firms with substantial market power — predatory pricing, self-preferencing, refusal to supply, excessive pricing. Article 102 TFEU; Chapter II CA98.
• Merger control: Prior review of transactions that may substantially lessen competition, under the EU Merger Regulation and national or regional equivalents.
• State aid and subsidy control: Scrutiny of public subsidies that distort competition. Articles 107–109 TFEU in the EU.
• Digital markets regulation: Predetermined obligations on designated platforms, imposed without a finding of anti-competitive conduct.

What is the qualified effects doctrine?

The qualified effects doctrine lets EU competition law reach conduct occurring outside the European Union where that conduct produces foreseeable, immediate and substantial effects inside the EU internal market. The General Court first articulated it in Gencor (T-102/96); the Court of Justice confirmed it in Intel (C-413/14 P).

All three limbs must be satisfied. The doctrine is what allows the European Commission to act against cartels coordinated abroad, mergers between non-EU parties, and dominance abuses by firms with no EU establishment, provided the EU-market effect is made out.

What are the key differences between EU and African merger control?

The EU applies one substantive test across all member states; African merger control is fragmented across national and regional regimes with varying tests, generally lower thresholds, an express public-interest dimension in some jurisdictions, and less published case law. Timelines also vary far more widely in Africa.

The public interest dimension is the sharpest divergence. South Africa permits remedies on employment, transformation, supplier development, and local ownership grounds that the EU system does not recognise as competition concerns at all.

How do cross-border mergers work in Africa?

A single African cross-border transaction typically triggers notification in several places at once: one or more regional authorities (COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS) plus national filings in each affected country. Thresholds are turnover- and asset-based and vary by regime, so parties map all applicable filings before signing.

In practice, parties preparing a pan-African deal coordinate timing across regulators and plan for the longest likely review period. The regional bodies have agreements with national authorities to reduce duplication, including a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the CCCC and EACCA on 10 June 2025, but parallel review remains common — particularly given that six EAC partner states are also COMESA members.

South Africa's public interest test adds a substantive layer that no other African jurisdiction imposes in the same form. The AfCFTA Competition Protocol, once operational, is designed to rationalise some of this complexity.

What are the COMESA merger filing thresholds?

Under the COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations, 2025, a merger is notifiable where the parties have combined COMESA turnover or assets of at least USD 60 million and at least two parties each meet USD 10 million. A separate digital market transaction-value threshold applies at USD 250 million.

The 2025 Regulations were adopted by the Council of Ministers on 4 December 2025 and came into force on 5 December 2025, repealing and replacing the 2004 regime. They introduced a fully suspensory merger control regime, revised the filing thresholds above, and added new procedural rules.

What are the EACCA merger notification thresholds?

The East African Community Competition Authority requires notification where the parties have combined turnover or assets of USD 35 million, with at least two parties each meeting USD 20 million. EACCA's merger control function commenced on 1 November 2025.

EACCA has clarified that mergers notified to it do not require separate national filings within EAC partner states — a meaningful simplification relative to the parallel-filing burden elsewhere on the continent.

What are the ERCA merger filing thresholds?

The ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority requires notification where the parties have combined turnover of 20 million Units of Account (approximately USD 26 million), or where at least two parties each have individual turnover of 5 million Units of Account (approximately USD 6.5 million).

Do I need to notify both a regional and a national competition authority in Africa?

Often yes, but it depends on the region. A transaction crossing both COMESA and national thresholds typically requires parallel filings, though the 2025 COMESA Regulations reinforce the CCCC's one-stop-shop role. EACCA takes the opposite approach: mergers notified to it do not require separate national filings.

The overlap is structural rather than accidental — six EAC partner states are also COMESA members, so a single East African transaction can engage two regional regimes plus national law. The CCCC and EACCA signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 10 June 2025 to reduce duplication.

The practical answer for any given deal turns on the specific turnover and asset footprint of the parties in each bloc, which is why filing analysis is done before signing rather than after.

How long does an EU merger review take?

Phase I of an EU merger review takes 25 working days. If the European Commission opens an in-depth Phase II investigation, that adds 90 working days, extendable to 125. Most notified transactions clear in Phase I.

African timelines vary far more widely, ranging from as short as 14 days to more than 120 days where public interest issues arise. For a deal requiring both EU and African clearance, the critical path is usually the slowest African regulator rather than Brussels.

What is the public interest test in South African merger control?

South Africa applies a public interest test alongside the standard competition test, allowing the authorities to impose merger remedies on grounds the EU system does not recognise: employment, transformation, supplier development, and local ownership. No other African jurisdiction imposes it in the same form.

The practical consequence is that a transaction raising no competition concern at all can still attract conditions, and that South African review timelines run longer than the competition analysis alone would suggest.

Which African countries have competition authorities?

More than 25 African countries have operational competition authorities, alongside three regional bodies (COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS) and an anticipated continental authority under the AfCFTA Competition Protocol. The most active national regulators are in South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt and Morocco.

• Principal national regulators: South Africa's Competition Commission, Nigeria's Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC), Kenya's Competition Authority, Egypt's Egyptian Competition Authority, Morocco's Conseil de la concurrence, Mauritius's Competition Commission, and Tunisia's Conseil de la concurrence.
• Further national authorities: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
• Regional bodies: The COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission (CCCC), the East African Community Competition Authority (EACCA), and the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (ERCA).
• Continental: The AfCFTA Competition Authority, anticipated under the AfCFTA Competition Protocol.

What is the role of COMESA in competition law?

The COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission (CCCC) is the supranational competition and consumer protection regulator for the 21 member states of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. It reviews regional-dimension mergers, investigates anti-competitive conduct with regional effects, and harmonises competition policy across member states.

The CCCC, formerly the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC), operates under the COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations, 2025, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 4 December 2025 and in force from 5 December 2025, repealing and replacing the 2004 regime.

The 2025 Regulations introduced a fully suspensory merger control regime, revised filing thresholds, new procedural rules, a digital market transaction-value threshold, gatekeeper obligations, and clarified the interface between COMESA and national merger control. A transaction crossing both national and COMESA thresholds typically requires parallel filings, though the 2025 Regulations reinforce the CCCC's role as a one-stop shop for mergers meeting regional thresholds.

• Reviewing mergers with a cross-border regional dimension that meet COMESA turnover thresholds.
• Investigating anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominance with regional effects.
• Consumer protection enforcement.
• Harmonising competition policy across member states.

What is the East African Community Competition Authority (EACCA)?

EACCA is the regional competition regulator for the eight-member East African Community. Its mandate covers anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, and mergers with an EAC dimension. After an extended establishment phase, its merger control function commenced on 1 November 2025.

The eight EAC partner states are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

EACCA operates under the EAC Competition Act 2006 as amended by the Competition (Amendment) Act 2010 and the Competition (Amendment) Act 2023. Parties to deals affecting multiple EAC member states must now consider EACCA notification alongside national filings, though EACCA has clarified that mergers notified to it do not require separate national filings.

What is the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (ERCA)?

ERCA, known by its French acronym ARCC, is the supranational competition regulator for the Economic Community of West African States. Headquartered in The Gambia, it became fully operational in October 2024 following the swearing-in of the members of the Council. Its remit covers anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, and regional-dimension mergers.

ECOWAS currently comprises twelve member states following the formal withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger on 29 January 2025: Benin, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

The ERCA framework establishes filing thresholds, substantive tests, and coordination mechanisms with national competition authorities. Early decisions have focused on consumer goods and services, establishing the emerging case law. ERCA's operationalisation completes the pattern of three major African regional competition bodies now functioning in parallel with national regimes.

What is the FCCPC in Nigeria?

The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) is Nigeria's principal competition and consumer protection regulator. It was established by the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2018, which gave Nigeria its first comprehensive competition statute, repealing and replacing earlier sector-specific provisions.

The FCCPC's enforcement record since 2019 has grown steadily, with significant activity in technology platforms, consumer goods, and financial services.

• Merger review under a threshold-based notification regime.
• Enforcement against anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominance.
• Consumer protection and the regulation of restrictive business practices.
• Market studies, and the development of ex ante rules for digital platforms.

What is abuse of dominance under South African competition law?

Abuse of dominance in South Africa is governed by sections 8 and 9 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, read with section 7, which sets the test for dominance. Section 8 prohibits excessive pricing, refusal of access to an essential facility, and exclusionary acts; section 9 prohibits price discrimination by a dominant firm.

Section 8 also names specific practices — minimum resale price maintenance, bundling and others — which are prohibited where the anti-competitive effect outweighs efficiency gains. Section 9 bites where price discrimination substantially reduces competition.

The Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal, and Competition Appeal Court apply these provisions. Penalties can reach 10 per cent of a firm's annual turnover.

What market share makes a firm dominant in South Africa?

Section 7 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 sets three bands. A market share of 45 per cent or more is deemed dominant — an irrebuttable presumption. Between 35 and 45 per cent a firm is presumed dominant unless it shows it lacks market power. Below 35 per cent, the complainant must prove market power.

How does competition law promote economic development in Africa?

Competition law supports African economic development through four channels: cartel enforcement removes price overcharges in essential goods, merger control keeps markets contestable, dominance rules protect smaller firms from exclusion, and regulator advocacy drives pro-competitive reform in sectors historically dominated by state-owned or politically connected enterprises.

The AfCFTA Competition Protocol is designed to reinforce these channels by creating continental rules that reduce incentives for anti-competitive conduct to shift between jurisdictions.

• Cartel enforcement: Removes price overcharges in essential goods and services, benefiting consumers and downstream producers. UNCTAD has estimated that cartels in developing economies can raise prices by 20 to 40 per cent above competitive levels.
• Merger control: Prevents the entrenchment of dominant incumbent firms, keeping markets contestable for African and foreign new entrants.
• Abuse of dominance rules: Protect small and medium enterprises from exclusionary practices by large firms.
• Advocacy: Competition authorities can drive pro-competitive regulatory reform in sectors historically dominated by state-owned or politically connected enterprises.

How does EU competition law apply to African markets?

EU competition law reaches conduct outside the European Union where that conduct produces foreseeable, immediate and substantial effects inside the EU internal market. This is the qualified effects doctrine, first articulated in Gencor (T-102/96) and confirmed by the Court of Justice in Intel (C-413/14 P).

In practice the European Commission can review mergers between African-domiciled parties that meet EU turnover thresholds, prosecute cartels that affect EU markets even if coordinated from Africa, and sanction dominance abuses that foreclose EU-based customers.

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation expands this reach by catching subsidised acquisitions and procurement bids in the EU by undertakings that received foreign state support, including support from African governments or state-backed entities.

How does UK competition law differ from EU competition law post-Brexit?

The UK now operates an independent regime under the Competition and Markets Authority. Substantive rules remain closely modelled on EU law — Chapters I and II of the Competition Act 1998 mirror Articles 101 and 102 TFEU — but the CMA reviews deals in parallel with, not subordinate to, the European Commission, and practical divergence is growing.

Global deals often require both UK and EU clearance with differing timelines, remedies and outcomes. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 introduced a UK-specific Strategic Market Status regime for digital platforms that operates differently from the EU Digital Markets Act.

The CMA has been notably more assertive than the EU on some deals, creating a risk of remedy divergence. UK courts are no longer bound by post-Brexit CJEU jurisprudence, though pre-Brexit CJEU case law remains persuasive.

How does state aid regulation work in the EU?

EU state aid law is governed by Articles 107 to 109 TFEU. Article 107(1) prohibits aid granted by a member state or through state resources that distorts competition by favouring certain undertakings, insofar as it affects trade between member states. The European Commission is the sole authority empowered to approve, block, or order recovery of aid.

Articles 107(2) and 107(3) list automatic and discretionary exemptions. Member states must notify proposed aid measures in advance and may not implement them without Commission approval — the standstill obligation. Block exemption regulations (GBER) and de minimis rules exempt smaller or non-problematic measures from prior notification.

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation now extends complementary control to non-EU subsidies that distort the EU internal market.

What is the standstill obligation in EU state aid law?

The standstill obligation requires an EU member state to notify a proposed aid measure to the European Commission in advance and to refrain from implementing it until the Commission has approved it. Aid granted in breach is unlawful and may be ordered recovered from the recipient with interest.

Block exemption regulations (GBER) and de minimis rules carve out smaller or non-problematic measures from the prior-notification requirement, which is why the great majority of member state aid measures never reach Brussels.

What is the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation?

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation extends EU control to subsidies granted by non-EU states that distort the EU internal market. It catches subsidised acquisitions and public procurement bids in the EU by undertakings that received foreign state support, including support from African governments or state-backed entities.

It complements rather than replaces the state aid regime: Articles 107 to 109 TFEU address subsidies from EU member states, while the Foreign Subsidies Regulation addresses the equivalent distortion originating outside the Union.

How does the EU Digital Markets Act compare to African digital market regulation?

The EU Digital Markets Act imposes predetermined obligations on designated gatekeeper platforms without any finding of anti-competitive conduct. No African jurisdiction currently has a designation-plus-obligation regime as comprehensive, though South Africa, Nigeria and COMESA are each moving in that direction by different routes.

The AfCFTA Digital Trade Protocol may introduce continental-level rules over time.

What is a gatekeeper under the EU Digital Markets Act?

A gatekeeper is a platform formally designated under the EU Digital Markets Act, which then becomes subject to a predetermined list of obligations and prohibitions. The defining feature is that these apply automatically on designation — no finding of anti-competitive conduct is required, unlike enforcement under Article 102 TFEU.

This ex ante structure is what distinguishes the DMA from conventional competition enforcement, and what African regimes are selectively borrowing. The COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations, 2025 now carry regional gatekeeper obligations, and Nigeria's FCCPC is developing a Digital Platforms Order modelled partly on the DMA.

Does Africa have a Digital Markets Act equivalent?

Not yet in comprehensive form. No African jurisdiction currently operates a designation-plus-obligation regime as complete as the EU Digital Markets Act. The closest is the COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations, 2025, which introduced regional gatekeeper obligations and digital market provisions.

The COMESA provisions prohibit price parity clauses, anti-steering provisions, self-preferencing, and failures to identify paid ranking, and set a digital market transaction-value threshold of USD 250 million. Nigeria's FCCPC is separately developing a Digital Platforms Order with ex ante obligations modelled partly on the DMA, and South Africa has used market inquiry powers to impose targeted platform remedies.

How are cartels enforced in Africa?

Cartel enforcement in Africa is active but uneven. South Africa leads by volume, pursuing bid rigging, price fixing and market allocation under a Corporate Leniency Policy that mirrors international best practice. Nigeria's FCCPC and the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission are also active, the latter with regional cartel jurisdiction.

Leniency programmes are offered by the CCCC and several national authorities, though uptake varies. Common detection tools include leniency applications, market screening, complaint-driven investigations, and cooperation with international authorities under mutual assistance arrangements.

Many African regimes treat cartel conduct as an administrative rather than criminal matter, distinguishing them from the UK and US where criminal sanctions apply.

Are cartels a criminal offence in Africa?

In most African jurisdictions, no. Many African regimes treat cartel conduct as an administrative matter enforced through fines and remedies rather than a criminal offence. South Africa is the notable exception, alongside the United Kingdom and the United States, where criminal sanctions including personal liability are available.

Where conduct is administrative only, deterrence rests on the size of penalties and the strength of leniency incentives rather than on individual criminal exposure. This is one reason leniency programme design receives so much attention in African enforcement policy.

Do African competition authorities offer leniency programmes?

Yes. South Africa's Competition Commission operates a Corporate Leniency Policy that mirrors international best practice, and the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission and several national authorities offer leniency programmes. Uptake varies considerably across jurisdictions.

Leniency applications remain one of the primary cartel detection tools across the continent, alongside market screening, complaint-driven investigations, and cooperation with international authorities under mutual assistance arrangements.

How much do cartels raise prices in developing economies?

UNCTAD has estimated that cartels in developing economies can raise prices by 20 to 40 per cent above competitive levels. This is the central reason cartel enforcement is treated as a development priority rather than a purely legal one — the overcharge falls on consumers and downstream producers.

What are the penalties for breaching competition law?

Fines are the primary sanction, commonly capped at 10 per cent of turnover. South Africa's Competition Act 89 of 1998 permits penalties of up to 10 per cent of a firm's annual turnover, and the EU applies a comparable ceiling based on worldwide turnover. Behavioural and structural remedies may be imposed alongside fines.

In digital markets, authorities increasingly impose bespoke ex ante obligations rather than relying on after-the-fact penalties. Individual criminal liability is available in the United Kingdom and the United States, but most African regimes treat cartel conduct as administrative rather than criminal.